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THE WILSONIAN DILEMMA
Mark David Hall
East Central University
This essay exploresJames Wilson’sapproach to the so-called “Madisonian
Dilemma. I first explain how the tension between majority rule and
minority rights was more extremefor Wilsonthanfor mostfounders. I then
show how his view of human nature and moral epistemology allowed him
to resolve the dilemma. Although Wilson’s solution may be less realistic
than Madison’s, it is still worthy of serious consideration because of its
influence on the creation of America’s constitutional system.
”

J a m e s Wilson (1742-1 798) is perhaps the most underrated founder.
One of only six men to sign both the Declaration and the Constitution, his
influence on the latter was second only to that of James Madison. Wilson
also played a central role in the ratifying debates, and he was the moving
force behind the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. Furthermore, as a law
professor and Supreme Court Justice, he produced some of the period’s
most profound commentary on the Constitution and American law.
In spite of his importance, Wilson’s political theory has been relatively
ignored by the scholarly community. This article contributes toward remedying this gap in the literature by addressing Wilson’s approach to a central
theme in American political theory: the conflict between majority rule and
the protection of minority rights. Often described as the “Madisonian
Dilemma,” the tension between these two ends was actually more extreme
for Wilson than Madison. Yet, although Wilson came to a significantly
different solution to the problem, his approach to the dilemma has never
been systematically examined and analyzed. This may be because his
solution is less realistic than Madison’s, but even so it should be studied
because of its influence on the creation of the American republic.’

NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
James Wilson did not have a theory of minority rights per se. Instead,
he believed that all individuals possess natural rights, whether they are in
the minority or the majority. These rights are based upon an explicitly
theistic theory of natural law. He taught that “our Creator has a supreme
right to prescribe a law for our conduct, and that we are under the most
perfect obligation to obey that law, are truths established on the clearest and
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most solid principles” (McCloskey 1967, 126). But as clear as these truths
were to Wilson, and in spite of his clear presentation of them in his law
lectures, many contemporary scholars have ignored this aspect of his
thought. It is necessary, therefore, to briefly outline his theory of natural
rights.2
Wilson followed Richard Hooker, who himself borrowed from St.
Thomas Aquinas, when he divided law into several categories. First Wilson
proposed that all law should be divided into two main classes, divine and
human. The former may be divided into four species: (1) eternal law, (2)
celestial law, (3) physical laws, and (4) “that law which God has made for
man in his present state” (McCloskey 1967, 124). The latter, Wilson
explained, is called the “law of nature,” if it is addressed to men, or “the
law of nations,” if it is addressed to political societies (McCloskey 1967,
123).
The second great class of law is known as “human law.” This law
“must rest its authority, ultimately, upon the authority ofthat law, which is
divine” (McCloskey 1967, 123). Wilson taught that it is divided into two
species: “1. That which a political society makes for itself. This is
municipal law. 2. That which two or more political societies make for
themselves. This is the voluntary law of nations” (McCloskey 1967, 125).
Wilson was clear that both kinds of law must correspond to natural law, or
they are void. It is from this principle that he derived his theory of natural
rights.
Wilson did not make the sort of distinctions between the terms “natural
law,” “natural right,” and “natural rights” that some philosophers make!
Instead, he thought that natural rights are simply what individuals are
“entitled” to by “nature and nature’s law” (McCloskey 1967, 589,722).
To claim a natural right is simply another way of appealing to natural law.
For instance, if natural law dictates that all persons must be free, it follows
that individuals have a natural right to be free. It is therefore necessary for
positive law to respect the natural right to freedom.
Wilson’s most extensive discussion of natural rights is seen in his law
lecture entitled “Of the Natural Rights of Individuals.” He began by
criticizing Edmund Burke and Sir William Blackstone because he thought
that they taught that the origin of natural rights is merely human. Instead,
Wilson argued that men and women possess rights based on natural law
regardless of where or when they live. Central among these are the rights
of individuals to safety, property, character, and liberty. He had a fairly
expansive understanding of the latter concept, arguing that it includes
freedom ofreligion and the right to “think, to speak, to write, and to publish
freely” (McCloskey 1967, 579).5
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Wilson believed that individuals possess rights other than those mentioned above. It is not necessary, for the purposes of this essay, to examine
these rights in detail. What is important is that governments must protect
rights. In fact, Wilson argued that governments “should be formed to
secure and to enlarge the exercise of the natural rights of its members; and
every government, which was not his view, and its principal object, is not
a government ofthe legitimate kind” (McCloskey 1967,592). All members
of society should be equally protected by these laws, whether they are in a
minority or a majority, because law is founded upon moral principles, not
popular opinion. Foreshadowing John Stuart Mill’s opposition to majority
tyranny, Wilson wrote that:
On one side, indeed, there stands a single individual: on the other
side, perhaps, there stand millions: but right is weighed by principle;
it is not estimated by numbers (McCloskey 1967, 577. Compare
with Mill 1989, 20).
No other conclusion is warranted, Wilson taught, since natural law was
created by God and therefore provides an absolute, immutable, and universal moral standard. The individual rights of men and women are founded
on this law. Human laws must be based on this higher law if they are to be
valid. Any human law that does not meet this criterion is void. Wilson’s
view of natural rights must be considered a “strong” theory because he held
that everyone’s rights, even those of a small minority, must always be
protected. How this may be done, and how natural lawhights may be known
is discussed below. First, however, it is necessary to examine the other horn
of the Wilsonian Dilemma.

WILSON THE DEMOCRAT
Because Wilson believed so strongly that individual rights must be
protected, one might assume he would join many of the other founders in
their distrust of majority rule. Indeed, James Madison suggested in a letter
to Thomas Jefferson that
the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from
acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from
acts in which the Government is mere instrument of the major
number of its constituents (Meyers 1973, 206).

In addition to theoretical problems he might have had, Wilson had also been
a victim of mob violence, the ultimate tyranny ofthe majority (Smith 1956).
It is somewhat surprising, then, that he was one of the most consistent and
ardent promoters of democracy in late eighteenth century America. Wilson
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held that governments must be based on consent if they are to be legitimate.
Further, he vigorously advocated institutions of government that maximize
citizen participation in public affairs. Although one commentator’s description of him as an advocate of “unrestrained majoritarianism” is an
exaggeration, he was clearly one of the foremost democrats in the founding
period (Rossum 1976, 1 16).
Central to Wilson’s theory of government is the importance of popular
consent. He noted “[tlhat the supreme power ...should be vested in the
people, is in myjudgement the great panaceaof human politics. It is apower
paramount to every constitution, inalienable in its nature, and indefinite in
its extent” (McMaster and Stone 1970, 230). Wilson taught that popular
consent could be transferred to a legitimate government through the device
of a social contract. He followed Locke, however, in arguing that the people
always retain their sovereignty, they cannot contract it away (McMaster and
Stone 1970; Locke 1988). While Americans might place a system of
government over themselves, they are always sovereign. They are the
foundation upon which government is dependent. Their consent, he proposed, is the “sole legitimate principle of obedience to human laws”
(McCloskey 1967, 180).6
Wilson’s theory of popular sovereignty led him to have a more progressive view of suffrage than most ofhis contemporaries. Believing that every
independent person should be able to vote, he taught that
[tlhis darling privilege of freeman [suffrage] should certainly be
extended as far as considerations of safety and order will possibly
admit. The correct theory and the true principles of liberty require,
that every citizen, whose circumstances do not render him necessarily dependent on the will ofanother, should possess avote in electing
those, by whose conduct his property, his reputation, his liberty, and
his life, may be all most materially affected (McCloskey 1967,406).
For Wilson, only those individuals free from the direct influence of others
should vote. Through the use of this standard he concluded that suffrage
should be given to “every freeman.” Following this principle, he joined
his colleagues in concluding that children should not vote because they are
under the direct control of their parents. Similarly, women, presumed to be
under the control of their husbands, and slaves, clearly controlled by their
masters, had no right to suffrage (McCloskey 1967).7
Many of Wilson’s contemporaries also applied this logic to males who
did not own land. Gouverneur Morris, for instance, proposed that there be
a free-hold qualification for voting in national elections because landless
males would be easily controlled by the rich. Although this provision was
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supported by many founders, including James Madison, Wilson rejected it
as unnecessary and dangerous. The Convention eventually compromised
by allowing states to decide their own qualifications (Farrand [ 191 11 1966).
Many of them eventually chose to liberalize their voting laws to meet
Wilson’s more democratic standards. In Pennsylvania, he personally led
the fight in the convention of 1789-90 which resulted in an “almost
negligible tax qualification for voting” (McCloskey 1967, 5).
Wilson consistently advocated a liberal view of suffrage. In this manner
he attempted to broaden the foundation of government. To him, government is like a pyramid, with a constituent people as its base. He explained
that
[tlthe pyramid of government-and a republican government may
well receive that beautiful and solid form-should be raised to a
dignified altitude: but its foundation must, of consequence, be
broad, and strong, and deep. The authority, the interests, and the
affections of the people at large are the only foundation, on which a
superstructure, proposed to be at once durable and magnificent, can
be rationally erected (McCloskey 1967, 403).
Thus the people are the foundation upon which a constitution can be based.
The government is then created by this document, which outlines the powers
of the various institutions. Theoretically institutions could take a multitude
of forms, so long as the people consent to them. To Wilson, however, the
best government is that which maximizes the participation of the people.
Accordingly, he was the most consistent proponent of democracy at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787.*
From the start of the Convention, Wilson contended that every institution should be as firmly based in the direct consent ofthe people as possible.
For instance, he advocated the direct popular election of both representatives and senators. In addition, he argued that since people, not states,
are the basis of representation, members of both houses ought to be elected
from proportionally sized districts to prevent unfair influence by a minority
(Farrand 1966). He explained that
all elections ought be to equal. Elections are equal, when a given
number of citizens, in one part of the state, choose as many representatives, as are chosen by the same number of citizens, in any other
part of the state. In this manner, the proportion of representatives
and of the constituents will remain invariably the same (McCloskey
1967,406).
For the same reason Wilson proposed the direct, popular election of the
e x e c ~ t i v e .In
~ doing so he realized that he was at odds with much of the
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conventional wisdom of his day. He admitted that his proposal might be
considered “chimerical,” but he noted that “at least in theory he was for an
election by the people” (Farrand 1966, I:68). When few delegates supported this proposal, Wilsonjoined with others to contain his loss by helping
to form the electoral college. This vehicle allowed the states to appoint
electors in any manner they saw fit, which at least left open the possibility
that states could choose them by popular vote (Farrand 1966; McCloskey
1967). He also fought for a variety of small details that illustrate his
profound commitment to democracy.I0
Skeptics have claimed that Wilson supported majority rule simply for
rhetorical reasons, or because his state would benefit from representation
on the basis of population (Jenson 1956; Sargent 1988). Such analysis
ignores Wilson’s advocacy of democracy throughout his lifetime. For
instance, Wilson, as the undisputed leader of Pennsylvania’s constitutional
convention of 1789-90, deserves credit for winning the direct, popular
election of the governor, representatives, and senators (Seed 1978;
McCloskey 1967). He also faithfully supported the principle of one-manone-vote, arguing that it should be applied to each branch of the legislature.
Finally, he again showed himselfto be a consistent democrat even regarding
the details of government when he opposed any form of term limits and
supported a provision for compulsory voting, “if elections are not properly
attended” (Seed 1978,137).
Wilson was one of this country’s greatest democrats in the founding era.
On many issues he was far ahead of his time. For example, Wilson’s ideal
of a popularly elected senate was not constitutionally protected until the
Seventeenth Amendment was ratified in 1913. Similarly, his principle of
one-man-one-vote was not guaranteed until the 1964 Supreme Court case
Wesberty v. Sunders. And to this day, America has still not adopted
Wilson’s proposal that the people directly elect the president. It thus is fair
to conclude with Charles Page Smith that Wilson
believed in the political capacity of the people, and was anxious to
have them exercise political power directly rather than filtered
through various political mediums designed to sift out “ignorant
passions.” Far more than most of his colleagues Wilson stood in the
main current of what was to become the American democratic
tradition (1956, 238).

MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND HUMAN NATURE
The “Wilsonian dilemma” arises because of Wilson’s support for two
good but seemingly incompatible ends. On the one hand was his belief that
natural rights must be protected by the government. On the other was his
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insistence that governments must be based on the direct consent of the
people. For many thinkers these two goals are mutually exclusive. Wilson,
however, believed that majority rule and the creation of human law in
agreement with natural law (thereby not violating natural rights) went
hand-in-hand. He reached this conclusion because of his moral epistemology and view of human nature.
Wilson contended that the “will of God,” in moral matters, is discovered
through “our conscience, by our reason, and by the Holy Scriptures”
(McCloskey 1967, 133). If there seems to be disagreement among these,
he proposed that “[wlhere the latter give instructions, those instructions are
supereminently authentick” (McCloskey 1967, 144). Revelation given to
men and women in the Bible contains “moral precepts” that “form a part
of the law of nature” (McCloskey 1967, 143). But these principles deal
primarily with the relationship between God and individuals. Because the
Scriptures do not give specific instructions on many matters,
whosoever expects to find, in them particular directions for every
moral doubt which arises, expects more than he will find. They
generally presuppose a knowledge of the principles of morality; and
are employed not so much in teaching new rules on this subject, as
in enforcing the practice of those already known, by a greater
certainty, and by new sanctions (McCloskey 1967,144).
Thus, while Wilson respected and deferred to the Bible, he did not think
that it contained the sort of practical moral guidance necessary for governing individuals and society. Instead, he proposed that to solve most moral
problems, God gave men and women a moral sense and reason to provide
knowledge of the natural law.
Wilson borrowed from both Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Reid when
he argued that all men and women have a sixth sense whereby they
intuitively know the difference between right,and wrong.” As evidence for
the moral sense, Wilson pointed to the ability of children to distinguish
between good and bad actions, even though their ability to reason is not
well developed. He also made an anthropological argument, referring to
the fact that every culture and language has similar notions ofvalue. Wilson
admitted that he could not “prove” the existence of a moral sense. It is
something all individuals simply “feel.” He explained that:
The science of morals, as well as other sciences, is founded on truths,
that cannot be discovered or proved by reasoning. Reason is confined to the investigation of unknown truths by the means of such as
are known. We cannot, therefore, begin to reason, till we are
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furnished, otherwise than by reason, with some truths, on which we
can found our arguments (McCloskey 1967, 133).
The moral sense provides knowledge of the basic principles of natural
law. Usually this knowledge is sufficient to solve moral problems, but hard
cases occasionally arise. Wilson, quoting Reid, taught that:
Moral truths may be divided into two classes; such as are selfevident,
and such as, from the selfevident ones, are deduced by reasoning. If
the first be not discerned without reasoning, reasoning can never
discern the last. The cases that require reasoning are few, compared
with those that require none; and a man may be very honest and
virtuous, who cannot reason, and who knows not what demonstration
means (McCloskey 1967, 136).12
Most moral problems, then, may be solved by following the dictates of
one’s moral sense. Moral dilemmas that require individuals to reason from
intuitive first principles to the appropriate conclusion are rare. Unfortunately, Wilson did not explore the distinction between these two types of
moral problems, or even give examples of each kind. Perhaps he did not
think this was necessary since almost every moral problem may be solved
through the moral sense alone (McCloskey 1967).
Wilson acknowledged that there is an important difference between
knowing and doing good. Although all people possess a moral sense, not
all choose to follow it. This is because men and women have free wills.
Individuals may be led by their self-interest, passions, or prejudices to
ignore their moral impulses and do what they know is wrong. If they do so
over a long period oftime, their moral senses may become dull. In a similar
manner, if a society has bad laws, which are contrary to natural law, the
moral senses of its citizens may be corrupted (McCloskey 1967).
Yet Wilson clearly thought that most people know and follow correct
moral principles. In this respect he rejected the Hobbesian notion that men
are excessively self-interested. He also challenged the liberal mechanistic
view ofthe formation of society when he proposed that humans are naturally
sociable. He explained that “the Author of our existence intended us to be
social beings; and has, for that end, given us social intellectual powers”
(McCloskey 1967, 230). As such, men and women naturally form and
perpetuate societies. Further, within these societies they usually act in a
moral manner. “Even the most consummate liar,” he pointed out, “declares truths much more frequently than falsehoods” (McCloskey 1967,
395).
Wilson’s relatively positive view of human nature and society is not
surprising given his adherence to Scottish moral sense theory. Although
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the Scottish thinkers were not in total agreement on the subject, most of
them shared Wilson’s optimistic views (Bryson 1945; Schneider 1967).
Yet even if men and women are not predominantly self-interested, it does
not follow that they are not in need of training. To this end, as Beer (1 993),
Conrad (1 9 8 9 , Nedelsky (1990) have demonstrated, Wilson supported a
subtle form of civic ed~cati0n.l~He believed that properly designed
democratic institutions would help bring the people together and encourage
them to be patriotic. Through their participation in the new republic’s
government, he was confident that America would become a “progressive
state, moving on towards perfection” (McCloskey 1967, 84).
Wilson’s rejection ofthe liberal view of human nature and the formation
of society has led some to suggest that he was strongly influenced by the
classical republican tradition (Sellers 1994; Pascal 1991). There is a good
deal of truth in this claim as it applies to his understanding of civic
education, but ultimately this tradition alone cannot explain his political
theory. It is more accurate to say that he borrowed some classical ideas to
help create a state where natural rights can best be protected. Although he
defended these rights by appealing to natural law, his understanding ofthem
was relatively modern and his views regarding who could be citizens
encompassed far more people than most classical republicans would allow.
In the final analysis Wilson had an optimistic, but not utopian, view of
human nature. He thought that individuals are naturally sociable and that
they usually act in a moral manner. Through education and participation
in democratic institutions they can become better citizens. But Wilson was
enough of a realist to recognize that humans are occasionally “seduced, by
our passions and by our prejudices” (McCloskey 1967,291). Hence he saw
the necessity for government and laws.

WILSON’S SOLUTION
When Wilson coupled his optimistic view of human nature with his
moral sense theory, he arrived at a solution to the so-called Madisonian
dilemma. Because of his moral epistemology, he thought that most moral
problems could be solved by individuals through the use of their moral
sense. Since everyone possesses this sense equally, it follows that whatever
most people think is morally correct is, indeed, correct. Thus the surest way
to know moral truth is to look at the opinions ofthe people, not philosophers,
theologians, or other “experts” (McCloskey 1967).14
Wilson taught that the best way to make laws in agreement with natural
law is to make them according to the will of the people. “Happily,” he
remarked, “the general and most important principles of law are not
removed to a very great distance from common apprehension” (McCloskey
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1967,72). Majorities in a democracy can generally be trusted to enact fair
laws. Theoretically, since there is only one moral truth, and because all
men and women may know it, majority opinion should always be unanimous. Wilson recognized, however, that this is seldom the case. On any
given issue some people will be led astray by their own interests, or will be
unable to reason to correct conclusions. Also, lack of knowledge about a
situation might result in men and women reaching different conclusions.
In these circumstances, “the voice of the majority must still be deemed the
will of the whole” (McCloskey 1967,242). The only other option, Wilson
explained, is to adopt a minority’s opinion. This would be unfair and, more
important, probably wrong.
Following the will of the majority “is most reasonable; because it is not
so probable, that a greater number, as that a smaller number concurring in
judgement, should be mistaken’’ (McCloskey 1967, 243). Thus majority
rule is not an end in itself. Rather, majorities govern because they are more
likely than minorities to legislate according to the natural law. The latter
must abide by the decisions of the former because of their original consent
to a democratic form of government (McCloskey 1967).
Wilson was led by his understanding of moral sense philosophy and his
faith in human nature to embrace majority rule. Through the collective
judgement of the people, utilizing their moral sense and reason, natural law
can be known and translated into positive law. It must be emphasized that
Wilson supported democracy because it is the best way to know natural law,
not as an end in itself. Through democratic institutions it is possible to
create a system of law which “rests its authority, ultimately, upon the
authority of that law which is divine” (McCloskey 1967, 124).
In some respects, Wilson’s solution may leave one longing for, in
Samuel Beer’s words, “not only astringency of Madison’s style but the
skepticism of his psychology” (1993, 368). Yet Wilson was not simply a
philosopher who could stop reasoning when he reached an ideal conclusion.
He was also a politician who recognized the reality that individuals and
majorities do not always act morally. Undaunted by this fact, he carefully
expanded his theory to take this reality into account.

COUNTER-MAJORITAMAN CHECKS
Although Wilson was generally optimistic about the nature of persons,
he realized that humans are “frail and imperfect” (McCloskey 1967,278).
Men and women may act immorally in the pursuit of their own interests.
Even majorities might occasionally violate natural law if their passions
overrule their moral senses or, though these cases are rare, they are unable
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to reason to appropriate conclusions. It was in these sorts of circumstances
that tyranny could arise in the United States.
Wilson feared two types of tyranny. The first was that of a few corrupt
legislators conspiring to deprive the people of their rights and liberties. To
prevent this, Wilson supported a variety of measures that made it extremely
difficult to form such a cabal. These included the separation of powers and
checks and balances between the branches of the national government.
Perhaps more significant, the direct involvement of the people in regularly
selecting almost every member of government would prevent corruption
and minority tyranny (Farrand 1966; McCloskey 1967).15
More important for the purposes of this essay, however, was Wilson’s
fear of majority tyranny. He admitted that the masses occasionally act on
the basis of “self-interest,” “passions,” and/or “prejudices” or they “become inflamed by mutual imitation and example” (McCloskey 1967,291).
In these cases they may support dangerous or immoral laws. To restrain
the excesses of the majority, and its influence on their elected representatives, Wilson supported several important checks aimed at restricting
the power of the people and those representatives most immediately accountable to them. For instance, although he advocated the direct election
of senators, Wilson believed that they should have much longer terms than
representatives so that they would not be as immediately accountable to the
people. In this manner the Senate should serve as a check on hasty action
by the House of Representatives. For similar reasons Wilson also supported
the creation of a Council of Revision and an executive veto (Farrand 1966).
The most significant counter-majoritarian check that Wilson supported
was that of judicial review of both state and congressional legislation
(Farrand 1966). He believed that it is an important form of institutional
protection for the Supreme Court, and that it is a means of protecting the
rights of the people. In his law lectures, Wilson explained that legislation
might be vetoed by the executive and that it is
subject also to another given degree of control by the judiciary
department, whenever the laws, though in fact passed, are found to
be contradictory to the constitution (McCloskey 1967,300).
The Supreme Court is in a particularly good position to check Congress
because justices would be well trained in complex legal matters and would
be somewhat insulated from popular passions (McCloskey 1967; Farrand
1966). If laws contradict the Constitution, the Court may prevent their
enforcement. Wilson showed that he was serious in this regard when he
led two other judges in refusing to comply with an unconstitutional order
of Congress.16
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Although the concept ofjudicial review of congressional legislation was
not widely supported, Wilson also advocated the more controversial idea
that legislature is bound by something besides the Constitution. In his law
lectures he compared the United States to England, noting that English
courts have the ability to declare acts of Parliament void if they contradict
natural law. He then wrote that in the United States “the legislative
authority is subjected to another, beside that arising from natural and
revealed law; it is subjected to the control arising from the constitution”
(McCloskey 1967,329 [emphasis added]).17 Thus Wilson was prepared to
invest the Court with a good deal of power to check the will of the people,
as manifested through their representatives, on the basis of unwritten natural
law.
Wilson’s support of counter-majoritarian institutions and practices
seems to repudiate his democratic theory. If democracy is the best way to
make positive law in agreement with natural law, why is it ever necessary
to check the will of the people? To understand why Wilson was not
inconsistent in this regard, it is first important to recognize that most of his
so-called counter-majoritarian checks are actually fairly democratic. For
instance, both senators and the president are ultimately accountable to the
people-they
are simply less immediately accountable than representatives. Further, he was confident that these and other counter-majoritarian checks would not be used very often. Regarding judicial review, for
instance, he wrote that “[lfaws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be
dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to
justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect” (Farrand 1966, II:73).
He also argued forjudicial self-restraint, noting that a “prudent and cautious
judge” will “remember, that his duty and his business is, not to make the
law, but to interpret and apply it” (McCloskey 1967, 502).
Wilson did not seriously consider the possibility that the Court would
use its powers to thwart the majority on many issues. He believed it would
use its power ofjudicial review only rarely, and then to strike down blatantly
unconstitutional or unjust laws. Thus counter-majoritarian checks like the
Senate, the executive veto, and judicial review are best viewed as temporary
injunctions for preventing majorities from acting out of “passions” and
“prejudices” that are “inflamed by mutual imitation and example”
(McCloskey 1967,291). In the final analysis they cannot prevent the people
from passing a law or constitutional amendment, but this is as it should be
since the people are best able to create laws in agreement with natural law.
Further, through education and participation in democratic institutions the
people will eventually progress to the point where majorities can always be
trusted and checks and balances will no longer be needed (McCloskey
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1967). Until that day, however, Wilson was realistic enough to see their
utility.
CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that Wilson’s approach to the so-called Madisonian
dilemma has received little attention. The dilemma was more extreme for
Wilson than Madison insofar as he had a “stronger” theory of natural rights
and was more democratic than the latter. Yet, in a sense, the Madisonian
dilemma was not a dilemma for Wilson, since one of the two ends took
priority over the other. He did not support majority rule as an end in itself,
but merely as a means to protect minority rights
In the final analysis, it is tempting to criticize Wilson for having too
optimistic a view of human nature. Certainly many contemporary political
scientists are likely to prefer Madison’s more practical solutions. Yet
Wilson’s formulation of and solution to the Madisonian dilemma is worthy
of consideration if one agrees with his claim that the primary purpose of
government is to protect natural rights. If this is true, then Wilson’s
approach has merit insofar as he consciously addressed the problem of
creating political institutions capable of knowing and protecting these
rights.
Although Wilson and Madison differed in their understanding of the
Madisonian dilemma, in practice they supported very similar institutions
of government at the Constitutional Convention. Their primary difference
was that Wilson more readily supported thoroughly democratic institutions
such as the direct, popular, and proportionate election of representatives,
senators, and even the president. Since 1789, the Constitution has been
changed by amendments, court cases, and political practice to recognize
these ideals. As the Constitution has become more democratic, most
reasonable political scientists and historians would agree that America has
done a better job of protecting the rights of minorities. Although this
protection has sometimes apparently been expanded in spite of majority
opinion, it has always occurred within the constitutional framework envisioned by Wilson.
If Wilson’s practical solutions to the perennial problem of modern
democracy have been successful, it is only reasonable to carefully examine
the political theory which led him to embrace these solutions. In doing so
political scientists can learn more about the founding era, and they can better
understand America’s current constitutional system. Further, if Wilson’s
theory is correct, it may be possible to use his principles to help create new
democracies dedicated to the protection of the “natural rights of its mem-
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bers,” which is, after all, “the primary and the principle object in the
institution of government” (McCloskey 1967, 592).

NOTES
I extend my appreciation to the following people for reading and
commenting on this work at different times: George Klosko, Henry Abraham, David O’Brien, David Schultz, George Cary, Garrett Sheldon, William McClure, and especially to my wife Miriam. I am also grateful to the
Bradley Foundation for providing financial support for this project.
‘There have been several fine studies on various aspects of Wilson’s
thought, but given his importance it is fair to say that he has been relatively
ignored by the general scholarly community. The bibliography includes
the most important published studies of Wilson’s political theory. For
discussion of the Madisonian dilemma see especially Dahl(l956); Bickel
(1962).
2Scholars who ignore Wilson’s theistic natural law theory include Hills
(1 989)’ Conrad (1 985, 1988), Nedelsky ( 1990), and Horowitz (1 977).

Tompare Wilson’s classification of law with Hooker (1 888) and Aquinas (1945). Also see Obering (1938) and O’Donnell(l937).
4For an example of someone who uses these distinctions carefully see
Strauss (1950).
5Wilsondid not support the addition of a bill of rights to the Constitution
because he believed such a document would limit, rather than protect, the
rights of men and women. On this issue see McMaster and Stone (1970).
Arkes (1990) contends that Wilson’s argument has merit.
Jt is true, as Shain (1994) points out, that Wilson, like most founders,
would have rejected the excessively individualistic view of rights held by
many modern Americans. Yet Wilson’s view of rights was clearly more
liberal and less communal than Shain believes. Also see McCloskey
( 1967).
6For a good discussion of Wilson’s theory of sovereignty in relation to
federalism see Beer (1992) and Dennison (1977).
’It should be noted that Wilson opposed the institution of slavery and
apparently favored the right of freed slaves to vote (McCloskey 1967).
%ome of Wilson’s contemporaries argued that he was not democratic
enough. Chief among the evidence they cited was his opposition to the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776. His objections, however, stemmed
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from his belief that the institutions created by this document were flawed.
While he was concerned with majority tyranny, he was not against the
creation of democratic institutions. The connection between popular sovereignty and the creation of good laws is discussed below.
90n Wilson's contributions to the creation of the presidency see especially DiClerico (1987) and McCarthy (1 987).
'OFor instance, Wilson opposed all proposed restrictions on who could
hold office, including those based on age, country of origin, length of
residence, and length of time in office (Farrand 1966).
"Unlike some moral sense theorists, such as David Hume or Adam
Smith, Wilson contended that the moral sense gives knowledge of the
natural law. Scottish moral sense theory can be traced back to the Earl of
Shaftesbury. For further discussion see MacIntyre (1988), Hutcheson
(1969), Reid ([I7851 1827, [ 17641 1970), and Stimson (1990).
'*Wilson borrowed this passage from Thomas Reid (1 827, 353-55)
without citation.
13Theabove noted literature provides a good discussion of the importance of democratic participation and community in Wilson's thought, but
the authors neglect the significance of his natural law claims. As a result
they have difficulty explaining Wilson's counter-majoritarian checks. I
discuss these issues in the last two sections of this essay.
I4Wood(1991) emphasizes the relationship between moral sense theory
and democratic equality.
I5One of the most important reasons Wilson opposed the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776 was that it did not contain separated powers or checks
and balances that he believed necessary to prevent corruption. Nedelsky
(1990) proposes that Wilson's support for checks and balances was aimed
solely at tyranny by governing officials.

'6Huyburn'sCase (1 792). For further discussion see Farrand (1907-08).
"This passage is ignored by most recent discussions of Wilson's democratic theory. See, for instance, Nedelsky (1990), Conrad ( I 9 8 9 , Beer
(1993), and Hills (1989).
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